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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE:  A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
Tözün, Bahar 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Dr. Neil Arnwine 
 
 
September 2006 
 
 
 This thesis is a survey of the literature on the equity premium puzzle.  The 
puzzle was introduced in 1985 by Mehra and Prescott, who noted that the huge pre-
mium of equities over bonds is not consistent with the predictions of the Lucas-
Breeden representative agent paradigm that governs macroeconomic theory today.  
This thesis describes the equity premium puzzle, conveys the importance of its im-
plications, and classifies and reviews the approaches to explaining it.  
 
Keywords: Equity Premium Puzzle, Asset Pricing, Risk-free Rate Puzzle
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ÖZET 
 
HİSSE PRİMİ BİLMECESİ:  BİR LİTERATÜR İNCELEMESİ 
Tözün, Bahar 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Neil Arnwine 
 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
 
Bu tez, hisse primi bilmecesi literatürünün bir incelemesidir.  Bu bilmece, 
Mehra ve Prescott tarafından 1985 yılında literatüre kazandırılmış olup, hisse se-
netlerinin bonolara karşı priminin, modern makroekonomik kuramın en önemli bir 
parçası olan Lucas-Breeden paradigması ile uyumsuzluğunu ortaya koyar.  Bu tezde 
hisse primi bilmecesi ve sonuçlarının önemi anlatılmış, bilmeceyi çözümleme yolun-
daki yaklaşımlar sınıflandırılmış ve gözden geçirilmiştir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hisse Primi Bilmecesi, Varlık Değerlemesi, Risksiz Oran Bilme-
cesi 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In this thesis, my goal is to describe the Equity Premium Puzzle (EPP), convey its 
deepness and the importance of its implications, and review the EPP literature.  The 
equity premium puzzle literature is vast and I have made much use of a number of 
extensive surveys by Kocherlakota (1996), Mehra and Prescott (2003), and Campbell 
(2003). 
The equity premium puzzle is perhaps the most striking empirical phenome-
non in financial economic theory.  The following stylized facts constitute the EPP: 
Over the last one hundred years, the average real return to stocks in 
the United States has been about six percent per year higher than that 
on Treasury bills. At the same time, the average real return on Treas-
ury bills has been about one percent per year. (Kocherlakota, 1996: 
42) 
In their seminal paper, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find they cannot simultaneously 
account for an average equity premium higher than 0.35 percent per year and an av-
erage return on Treasury bills of less than 4 percent per year in a calibrated standard 
macroeconomic model under any values of their choice parameters within the pro-
posed ranges.  They have dubbed this inconsistency of real world data with the repre-
sentative agent paradigm, the “equity premium puzzle”.  In addition to Mehra and 
Prescott’s initial finding, the extent of the puzzle is widened by others:  “Further, in 
econometric tests, the conditional Euler equation of per capita consumption is also 
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rejected by Hansen and Singleton (1982), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), Ferson 
and Constantinides (1991), and others.” (Constantinides et al., 2002: 269, 270) 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) employ a variation of the representative agent 
model.  Because we base much of our economic intuition on the representative agent 
paradigm, our understanding of the macroeconomy will be impaired until we have 
explained the equity premium puzzle. The equity premium puzzle manifests the fail-
ure of paradigms central to financial and economic modeling to capture why indi-
viduals are so averse to the highly procyclical stock return risk.  “Hence the viability 
of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment, say, for instance, to 
gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies, is thrown open to 
question.” (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 911)  According to Atkeson and Phelan 
(1994), we will be able to answer R. Lucas’ (1987) question about how costly indi-
viduals find business cycle fluctuations in consumption growth, only after we explain 
this unexpectedly high level of aversion to stock return risk.  Grant and Quiggin 
(2005: 1, 2) summarizes the implications of the huge equity premium as:  
• The macroeconomic variability associated with recessions is very expensive. 
• Risk to corporate profits robs the stock market of most of its value. 
• Corporate executives are under irresistible pressure to make shortsighted, 
myopic decisions. 
• Policies—disinflation, costly reform—that promise long-term gains at the ex-
pense of short-term pain are much less attractive if their benefits are risky. 
• Social insurance programs might well benefit from investing their resources 
in risky portfolios in order to mobilize additional risk-bearing capacity. 
• There is a strong case for public investment in long-term projects and corpo-
rations, and for policies to reduce the cost of risky capital. 
Since Mehra and Prescott coined the puzzle, financial economists have been trying to 
explain these sizable differences between the real returns on bonds and equities.  
These differences in average returns have been associated to differences in the co-
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variance of return to each security with the typical investor’s consumption: (Camp-
bell 2003: 806) 
Finance theory explains the expected excess return on any risky asset 
over the riskless interest rate as the quantity of risk times the price of 
risk.  In a standard consumption-based asset pricing model of the type 
studied by Rubinstein (1976), Lucas (1978), Grossman and Shiller 
(1981) and Hansen and Singleton (1983), the quantity of stock market 
risk is measured by the covariance of the excess stock return with con-
sumption growth, while the price of risk is the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion of a representative investor.   
‘If covariance of return to a security i with the typical investor’s consumption 
(growth) is high, then selling the security reduces the variance in the typical inves-
tor’s consumption, so that the required (expected) return from the security is high to 
compensate for this risk.’  To address the equity premium puzzle we must first ad-
dress a serious problem with this statement that has long bothered financial econo-
mists:  
What(ever) is the Typical Investor’s Consumption? 
Analogous to the problem of the non-existence of a hypothetical market portfolio, we 
cannot measure the typical investor’s consumption.  Economic models have come up 
with proxies for it that can be measured. 
1.1. Theoretical Background 
This section introduces the major theoretical frameworks in macroeconomics that 
have been applied to the study of the EPP.   
1.1.1. The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model was developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), see also Black (1972).  The CAPM is a single-period discrete-time model, 
which assumes that the typical investor’s consumption is perfectly correlated with 
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the stock market return.  CAPM uses the stock market return as proxy for the typical 
investor’s consumption in the above argument, and we get:  ‘If covariance of return 
to a security i with the stock market return is high, then the security does not have a 
hedge value so that the expected return from the security is high.’  CAPM postulates 
for each security a beta coefficient that describes the linear relationship between the 
expected excess stock return and the excess return on the market portfolio.  If the 
beta of a stock is smaller than one, then the stock pays off when the market is doing 
poorly.  Low or negative beta securities have a hedge value, so they have a high price 
and a low expected return.   
Higher risk aversion increases the risk-return tradeoff.  This is measured by 
the Sharpe-ratio, [ ]( ) ifM rrE σ/− , the slope of the Capital Market Line. 
1.1.2. Intertemporal CAPM and Consumption CAPM 
The Intertemporal CAPM and Consumption CAPM extend the standard CAPM to a 
multi-period setting.  An advantage of ICAPM over the standard CAPM is that utility 
can be state-dependent, although the assumption of time-separability remains.  A key 
assumption in the CCAPM is additively separable preferences, which gives state 
independence of direct utility.  According to Abel (1991), since bond returns are de-
terminate in the CCAPM framework, how much higher an investor would value 
stocks over bonds depends quantitatively on two factors:  (1) the covariance of ex-
pected consumption growth with expected stock return and the covariance of ex-
pected consumption growth with bond return, the comparison of which tells us the 
extent that bonds are preferable as a hedge against consumption risk, and (2) the co-
efficient of relative risk aversion, α. 
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1.1.3. The Lucas-Breeden Representative Agent Model 
R. Lucas (1978) models a one-good endowment (pure exchange) economy with iden-
tical consumers.  He assumes that the endowment level follows a Markov process.  
The Lucas-Breeden representative agent model is an integral part of modern macro-
economic theory. (R. Lucas 1978, Breeden 1979)  It features per capita consumption 
that is perfectly correlated with the consumption stream of the typical investor.  
Therefore, the representative agent model uses per capita consumption as proxy for 
the typical investor’s consumption.  In this model, ‘if covariance of return to security 
i with per capita consumption is high, then security i does not have a hedge value, so 
that the expected return from the security is high.’ 
The representative agent maximizes the expected sum of a stream of constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) discounted period utilities: 
( )∑∞
=
−
+ ≥−0
1
0,
1s
st
s
t
cE αα
β α , (1) 
where β is the discount rate (a higher β leads investors to save more), and,  
α captures two distinct attitudes toward consumption: a higher α would mean 
higher risk aversion (dislike of change in levels of consumption in different 
states of the economy) and a higher incentive for smoothing intertemporal 
consumption.   
1.1.4. Real Business Cycle Models 
The real business cycle model was introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and 
Long and Plosser (1983).  “Real business cycle theory uses the stochastic growth 
model augmented to include the labor-leisure decision.” (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 
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925)  The theory provides another framework in which we can look at time-variation 
in the price of risk. 
1.1.5. Overlapping-Generations Models 
The overlapping-generations model was introduced by Allais in 1947 and popular-
ized by Samuelson in 1958.  It is a general-equilibrium model especially designed for 
dynamic analysis, in which sense it makes a good alternative to the Arrow (1964) - 
Debreu (1959) model.  Generations born at different periods live finite lifetimes, but 
the economy (possibly) goes on forever.  Thisbringsaboutanaturalhetero-
geneity across individuals at a point in time, aswell as life-cycle
considerationsforagivenindividualacrosstime. 
1.2. A Closely Related Puzzle:  That of the Risk-free Rate 
Campbell (2003: 807) points out, “Some authors, including Kandel and Stambaugh 
(1991), have responded to the equity premium puzzle by arguing that risk aversion is 
indeed much higher than traditionally thought, but what this actually brings about is 
the “risk-free rate puzzle” of Weil (1989).”  Within the framework of the preferences 
(1), when individuals are averse to risk, they are also averse to intertemporal differ-
ences in levels of consumption, because the two incentives are captured by a single 
parameter, α.  The large equity premium implies that individuals are highly risk 
averse.  In fact, the observed value of the equity premium is consistent with a very 
high value of the risk aversion parameter within the Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
framework.  The preferences (1) in turn imply that they do not like consumption 
growth.1  Although individuals have a big incentive to smooth intertemporal con-
sumption, and although the risk-free rate is very low, they still save enough that per 
                                                 
1 Generalized expected utility preferences, which do not make this implication, will be discussed later. 
 7
capita consumption grows rapidly. (Kocherlakota, 1996: 43)  The question why peo-
ple save so much that the average per capita consumption grows at around 2% per 
year when the risk free rate is so low is a second, closely related puzzle dubbed “the 
risk free rate puzzle”.  Another manifestation of the risk-free rate puzzle is that the 
rate of time preference which is around 4% is significantly higher than the risk-free 
rate.  There is a risk-free rate puzzle only if α is required to be larger than one so as 
to match up with the high equity premium. (Kocherlakota, 1996: 50) 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
MEHRA AND PRESCOTT (1985) 
 
 
 
Recall that, in a representative agent framework, the covariance of return to security i 
with per capita consumption is a measure of the security’s risk.  An investor appreci-
ates a security that has high return when per capita consumption is low, whereas 
he/she does not pay that sort of “hedge premium” for a security that pays off well in 
a “good state” when per capita consumption is high any way. 
In equilibrium, an individual must not be able to Pareto improve his/her wel-
fare by switching marginally from holding bonds to stocks or vice versa.  Of course 
this statement underlies the assumption that asset trading is costless.  Therefore an 
individual’s consumption profile must satisfy the following two first order condi-
tions: 
( ) 0 
11
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cE
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where Rst is the gross return to stocks from period (t-1) to period t, and Rbt is the 
gross return to bonds from period (t-1) to period t. 
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The representative agent assumption (definition): is to assume that (2a) and 
(2b) are satisfied for per capita consumption as well as for each individual’s con-
sumption.  
The representative agent assumption is valid when asset markets are com-
plete, “because after trading in complete markets, individuals become marginally 
homogeneous even though they are initially heterogeneous” (in preferences and lev-
els of wealth). (Kocherlakota, 1996: 48)  Indeed, the assumptions that asset markets 
are frictionless and complete imply that there is a representative consumer. (Kocher-
lakota, 1996: 53) 
2.1. Mehra and Prescott (1985) – The Analysis  
Mehra and Prescott (1985) “calibrate[d] an asset pricing model with time-separable 
isoelastic utility to see whether the model could deliver unconditional rates of return 
close to the historical average rates of return on stocks and Treasury bills.  They 
use[d] a 2-point Markov process for consumption (endowment) growth.” (Abel, 
1990: 40)  Letting endowment growth follow a Markov process as opposed to Lucas’ 
(1978) assumption that endowment level follows a Markov process “enables [Mehra 
and Prescott] to capture the non-stationarity in the consumption series associated 
with the large increase in per capita consumption that occurred in the 1889-1978 pe-
riod.” (Mehra and Prescott, 1985: 150)  Making use of their assumptions, Mehra and 
Prescott employ the first order conditions (2a) and (2b) to obtain a formula that ex-
presses the population mean of the real return to the S & P 500 and the population 
mean of the real return to the three month Treasury bill in terms of α and β, which 
are the two exogenous parameters of the representative agent model.  
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2.2. What is the Level of Relative Risk Aversion? 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that the value of the relative risk aversion parame-
ter, α, is central to the existence of the equity premium puzzle.  However, they do not 
include estimations of α or β in their paper.  In quest of a good restriction on the pa-
rameter of relative risk aversion, Mehra and Prescott (1985: 154) review the follow-
ing results: Arrow (1971) finds that α, with respect to wealth, is almost constant, 
should be approximately 1.  Friend and Blume (1975), presenting evidence based 
upon the portfolio holdings of individuals, assert that α is approximately 2.  Kydland 
and Prescott (1982), in their study of aggregate fluctuations, hold that α estimates lie 
between 1 and 2, to mimic the observed relative variabilities of consumption and 
investment.  Altuğ (1983) concludes that α is near 0.  Kehoe (1983), studying the 
response of small countries’ balance of trade to terms of trade shocks, gets an α near 
1.  According to Hildreth and Knowles’ (1982) study of the behavior of farmers, α 
estimates lie between 1 and 2.  Tobin and Dolde (1971), studying life cycle savings 
behavior with borrowing constraints, find that α can best be approximated by 1.5.  
Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that although these studies can be challenged indi-
vidually, “together they constitute an a priori justification for [their] restricting” α to 
vary between 0 and 10.   
Kocherlakota (1990c) shows that the estimation technique of Friend and 
Blume (1975) seriously underestimates α.  Kocherlakota (1996) criticizes Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) on the grounds that this is the only estimate that they cite from finan-
cial market data.  
Assuming constant relative risk aversion utility, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991: 
105) construct an example and conclude that the α value equal to twenty is too large 
to be believable.  Moreover, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) perform various estimations 
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of α.  Using Mehra and Prescott (1985) data, they estimate α to be 26.3.  They further 
note that “if consumption and the stock price index are each random walks, then the 
estimate of α should be multiplied by 2/3”, which results in an estimate of α of 17.5.  
Using 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for all families (stockholders and 
nonstockholders), they get an α estimate of 100.4.  Using PSID consumption data of 
only stockholders gives an α estimate of 35. (summarized in Table 3: 104)  They 
argue that although 35 is an implausibly high estimate, looking only at the consump-
tion of stockholders is a leap towards resolving the equity premium puzzle, the rea-
soning of which we will look into shortly.2 
Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) is a recent survey on estimations of values of 
absolute and relative risk aversion and prudence: “Estimates of the average value of 
relative risk aversion range from less than 1 to well over 40, and evidence of increas-
ing, decreasing, and constant relative risk aversion has been obtained.” 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) restrict the intertemporal discount parameter β to 
be between 0 and 1.  This restriction obviously does not call for as much justification 
as is necessary for the restriction on α.  However, Kocherlakota (1990a) shows that 
the discount factor, β, can be greater than 1 when interest rates are positive. 
Historical data tells that the covariance of (ex post) per capita consumption 
growth with (realized) stock returns is only slightly higher than the covariance of (ex 
post) per capita consumption growth with bond returns, therefore the small differ-
ence does not account for the large gap between stock and bond returns. (see Table 2 
of Kocherlakota 1996: 50) 
                                                 
2 Grossman, Melino, and Shiller (1987) show that time aggregation biases the estimate of α upward. 
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2.3. Mehra and Prescott (1985) – The Conclusion 
Mehra and Prescott find that for any values of their choice parameters α and β within 
their restrictions, they cannot simultaneously account for an average equity premium 
higher than 0.35 percent per year and an average return on Treasury bills of less than 
4 percent per year.  For the average equity premium to be as large as the historically 
observed equity premium, the value of α would have to be extremely high, around 30 
or 40, which is much higher than the conventionally accepted values for α. 
2.4. Mehra and Prescott (1985) – The Assumptions  
Mehra and Prescott’s puzzle is that plausible parameter values in the standard dy-
namic macroeconomic model are not consistent with the observed rates of return on 
equities and bonds.  To solve this puzzle, an obvious approach is to identify the mod-
eling assumptions used by Mehra and Prescott and then weaken or find alternatives 
to these modeling assumptions.  This has been the task of a multitude of papers since 
the puzzle was introduced.  Below, I identify and address the key modeling assump-
tions: 
? They assume time- and state-separable utility.  Individuals maximize the ex-
pected sum of a stream of Constant Relative Risk Aversion discounted period utili-
ties: 
( )∑∞
=
−
+ ≥−0
1
0,
1s
st
s
t
cE αα
β α , (1) 
? Asset markets are complete, i.e., individuals can write insurance contracts 
against any possible contingency.  In other words, individuals have a sufficiently 
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large set of assets available for trade that they can diversify any idiosyncratic risk in 
consumption. 
? Asset trading is costless, i.e., asset markets are frictionless. 
The following three assumptions have been ruled out by Kocherlakota (1996) as 
causes of the equity premium puzzle: 
? Per capita consumption growth follows a two state Markov chain constructed 
in such a way that the population mean, variance, and autocorrelation of consump-
tion growth are equivalent to their corresponding sample means in the United States 
data.  
? In period t, the only variables that individuals know are the realizations of 
current and past consumption growth.  
? The growth rate of the total dividends paid by the stocks included in the S & 
P 500 is perfectly correlated with the growth rate of per capita consumption, and the 
real return to the (nominally risk free) Treasury bill is perfectly correlated with the 
return to a bond that is risk free in real terms.  
2.5. A More Robust Restatement of the Puzzle 
According to Kocherlakota (1996), of the six assumptions of the original Mehra and 
Prescott paper, three are necessary - and sufficient - to imply the puzzle.  The other 
three more technical assumptions about the statistical behavior of consumption and 
asset returns are thus shown to be relatively unimportant.  Hence, Kocherlakota 
(1996) makes “a more robust restatement of the puzzle” and argues that any attempt 
to explain the puzzle must involve the relaxing of at least one of the above mentioned 
first three assumptions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
APPROACHES TO EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE 
 
 
 
A stylized fact observed by Campbell (2003: 806) is that “excess returns on U.S. 
stock over Treasury bills are highly forecastable.  The log price-dividend ratio fore-
casts 10% of the variance of the excess return at a 1-year horizon, 22% at a 2-year 
horizon, and 38% at a 4-year horizon.”  Because predictable variation in excess stock 
returns is an important component of equity volatility, researchers have developed 
models in which the quantity of stock market risk or the price of risk change through 
time.  ARCH and other econometric models show that the conditional variance of 
stock returns is highly variable.  “If this conditional variance is an adequate proxy for 
the quantity of stock market risk, then perhaps it can explain the predictability of 
excess stock returns.” Campbell (2003: 808) argues that this approach is problematic.   
A more likely possibility is that the price of risk varies over time.  Some 
modeling strategies aim to incorporate this feature.  “Time-variation in the price of 
risk arises naturally in a model with a representative agent whose utility displays 
habit-formation.”  “Time-variation in the price of risk can also arise from the interac-
tion of heterogeneous agents.” (Campbell, 2003: 809)  Another possible source of 
time-variation in the price of risk is irrational expectations of investors.   
Attempts to resolve the puzzle  
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include alternative assumptions on preferences, modified probability 
distributions to admit rare but disastrous events, survival bias, incom-
plete markets, and market imperfections.  They also include attempts 
at modeling limited participation of consumers in the stock market, 
problems of temporal aggregation and behavioral explanations. (Me-
hra and Prescott, 2003: 911) 
I examine some of these efforts below: 
3.1 Is It Due to the Data Set? 
Huge differences between the returns on bonds and equities are observed, even with 
the returns averaged over long periods of time.  Several attempts to explain away the 
puzzle using a different data set than Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) serve only to con-
firm the existence of an equity premium.  Mehra and Prescott (2003: 892-894) pro-
vide a good summary of these studies.  Hansen and Singleton (1983), Siegel (1992), 
Aiyagari (1993), Roy (1994), Kocherlakota (1994) and Siegel (1998) are some 
prominent papers.  Siegel’s (1998) data pertaining to years from 1802-1998 reveal a 
somewhat smaller premium of 4.1%.  Ibbotson Associates 2000 Yearbook gives an 
equity premium value as high as 8.4% for the years from 1926-2000. See Mehra and 
Prescott (2003: 894, Table 1) 
3.2 The Expected (Ex-ante) Equity Premium Vs. the Ex-post Equity Premium 
Another way to examine the reliability of the historical average rates of return is to 
estimate how close the historical (realized) average rates of return are to those levels 
of return investors expected when making their portfolio decisions.  Applying statis-
tical techniques to data from 1892 to 1988, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990) find 
that the average equity premium was 6.03 percent, but that the equity premium ex-
pected by investors could have been anywhere from 2.35 percent to 9.71 percent.  
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Even the low value of 2.35 percent for the equity premium is higher than what Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) can explain. (Abel, 1991) 
3.3 New Utility Functions 
Researchers have studied new utility functions in order to alleviate the “failure of 
simple log or power utility models to account for basic features of asset pricing 
data”. (Cochrane and Hansen, 1993: 2) 
3.3.1. Generalized Expected Utility 
is a generalization of (1) which separates the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
from the parameter of relative risk aversion.  Current utility, Ut, is described recur-
sively using the formula: 
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where a higher α would mean higher risk aversion (dislike of change in levels of 
consumption in different states of the economy),  
 1/ρ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.  A high 1/ρ means that, con-
sumption in different periods – with levels adjusted for the investor’s time 
preference – are good substitutes to each other.  
Ut is a constant elasticity function of current consumption and future utility.  Note 
that (1) can be obtained as a special case of (3) by setting α = ρ. 
Epstein and Zin (1989) point out that an important characteristic of these gen-
eralized expected utility (GEU) preferences is that they permit the degree of risk 
aversion to be disentangled from the degree of intertemporal substitutability.  As 
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observed by Hall (1985), Zin (1987), and Attanasio and Weber (1989), in the prefer-
ences (1), the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constrained to be equal to the 
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/1/ρ).  Therefore, highly 
risk-averse consumers must view consumption in different time periods as being 
highly complementary.  This is not the case with GEU preferences (3) in which two 
different parameters exist for these two independent tendencies to be captured by the 
model associated.  Kocherlakota (1990b: 186) asserts that, with data on asset prices 
and aggregate consumption, the GEU preferences (3) and the ‘standard’ preferences 
(1) are observationally equivalent (i.e., impose the same restrictions on the data) be-
cause such data only provide information on first order conditions.  When the as-
sumption that the growth rates of aggregate endowment (consumption) is i.i.d. over 
time is satisfied, the preferences (1) are enlarged to GEU preferences (3) by relaxing 
state-separability (while preserving state independence).  “State-separability is a sec-
ond-order restriction; thus, to the first order,” the preferences (1) and (3) “look the 
same.”  Epstein and Zin (1990), and Kocherlakota (1996), on the other hand, hold 
that disentangling risk aversion and intertemporal substitution can help explain the 
risk-free rate puzzle that appears within the preferences (1) framework by allowing 
intertemporal substitution and relative risk aversion to be high simultaneously.  The 
problem with this is that Campbell (2000) finds evidence that the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution is small.  
3.3.2. (Internal) Habit Formation 
Time-variation in the price of risk arises naturally when preferences exhibit habit 
formation. (Campbell, 2003: 809)  This approach integrates the previous period’s 
consumption to the temporal utility function in order to take into account the “iner-
tia” consumers might feel.  If last period’s consumption is higher, then the temporal 
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marginal utility is higher, meaning consuming one more unit at the margin adds more 
to this period’s utility vis-à-vis the case with lower consumption during the last pe-
riod.  A generic period utility function and the corresponding marginal utility are as 
follows: (Kocherlakota, 1996: 56) 
( )∑∞
=
−
−++ >−
−
0
1
1 0,
1s
stst
s
t
ccE λα
λβ α  (4) 
( ) ( ) αα λλβλ −+−− −−−= tttttt ccEccMU 11  (5) 
Major references on the asset pricing implications of habit formation in preferences 
are Constantinides (1990), Abel (1990), Heaton (1995), Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999), and Boldrin et al (2001). 
Kocherlakota’s (1996: 56) finding is that with preferences (4) that exhibit 
habit formation, the first order conditions are satisfied by choosing β equal to 0.99, α 
equal to 15.384 and λ equal to 0.174.  Kocherlakota (1996) further observes that in 
the ‘standard’ preference case (1), the first order conditions cannot be simultaneously 
satisfied by picking a β value less than or equal to 1.  Due to the high value of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion that satisfies the first order conditions, this im-
plies that habit formation does not resolve the equity premium puzzle. 
Constantinides (1990), on the other hand, studying a model with internal 
habit where utility is defined over the difference between current consumption and 
lagged past consumption, holds that the equity premium puzzle is resolved by means 
of a habit-formation specification but only by assuming negative time preference. 
Preferences that exhibit habit formation make the agent extremely averse to 
consumption risk even when the risk aversion parameter is small.  For small changes 
in consumption, changes in marginal utility can be large.  Therefore, while this ap-
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proach cannot resolve the equity premium puzzle without assuming extreme aversion 
to consumption risk, it can address the risk-free rate puzzle.  The induced aversion to 
consumption risk increases the demand for bonds, thereby reducing the risk-free rate.  
One problem is that if the growth rate of consumption is assumed to be i.i.d., the 
model implies that the risk-free rate will vary considerably (and counterfactually) 
over time.  Constantinides (1990) gets around this problem since the growth rate in 
his model is not i.i.d. (Mehra and Prescott 2003: 915) 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) feature  
a representative agent whose utility is a power function of the differ-
ence between consumption and “habit”, where habit is a slow-moving 
nonlinear average of past aggregate consumption.  This utility func-
tion makes the agent more risk-averse in bad times, when consump-
tion is low relative to its past history, than in good times, when con-
sumption is high relative to its past history. (Campbell 2003: 809) 
The model can generate a high equity premium through high stock market volatility 
together with a high average level of risk aversion.   
Since risk aversion increases precisely when consumption is low, it 
generates a precautionary demand for bonds that helps lower the risk-
free rate.  This model is consistent with both consumption and asset 
market data.  However, it is an open question whether investors actu-
ally have the huge time varying countercyclical variations in risk aver-
sion postulated in the model. (Mehra and Prescott 2003: 915) 
Equilibrium business-cycle models feature both asset returns and allocations as en-
dogenous.  Boldrin et al (2001) construct an equilibrium business-cycle model with 
habit persistence, which is consistent both with key asset-return facts and with key 
business-cycle facts.  In standard Real Business Cycle models, the volatility of capi-
tal gains is constant because the supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a constant 
price.  The volatility of capital gains is an important component of the volatility of 
the rate of return on equity.  Simply introducing habit persistence into the standard 
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RBC model, amplifies the fluctuations in the demand for capital over the business 
cycle.  But because capital supply is perfectly elastic, this has no impact on capital 
gains and negligible effect on the volatility of the return on equity.  Ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the volatility of the return on equity is an important positive factor on 
the equity premium.  Not having the desired effect of increasing the volatility of re-
turn on equity, the bare introduction of habit persistence fails to obtain an increased 
level of equity premium.  In their model, Boldrin et al (2001: 150) “incorporate fac-
tor-market inflexibilities which have the effect of reducing the elasticity of capital 
supply” in addition to habit persistence.  They do this “by replacing the standard one-
sector production technology with a two-sector specification in which adjusting fac-
tors of production takes time.”  They show that their model is consistent with the key 
features of asset returns.  
3.3.3. “Catching/Keeping up with the Joneses” 
James Duesenberry (1949) is the first to put forward that an individual’s utility is 
more a function of societal levels of (or per capita) consumption than of his/her own 
consumption.  Therefore, the individual’s attitude toward the variability in societal 
consumption, as well as his/her aversion to own-consumption risk, has implications 
on his/her saving and consumption decision.  Intuitively, consumers in fast growing 
countries should be borrowing against their future income, or at least saving margin-
ally less, than consumers in slowly growing countries.  But this is not the case ac-
cording to empirical studies.  Actually, there is a strong positive correlation between 
income growth and savings rates.  While this brings to mind that high savings rates 
may be the factor inducing fast growth, this strong positive correlation manifests 
itself with rapid income growth preceding rise in savings rates according to empirical 
work.  Duesenberry attempted to explain why the savings rate of individuals rises 
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with income but the national savings rate does not.  He asserted that it’s the relative 
rise in individual income that affects the individual’s savings decision.  When there 
is a rise in national income, the individuals’ relative income need not be affected, 
thus individuals’ savings decision stays the same.  Duesenberry’s relative consump-
tion model, according to which rising incomes would induce excessive consumption 
as individual’s try to “catch up with the Joneses”, is unlikely to explain the growth-
savings paradox.  Harbaugh (1996: 1) takes another perspective in relative consump-
tion: “Rather than increasing consumption, concern for relative consumption can 
induce a fear of falling behind which raises precautionary savings.  As societal in-
come growth increases this fear intensifies, allowing for a positive effect of growth 
on savings rates and potentially explaining the growth-savings paradox.” 
Abel (1990) and Gali (1994) are two major references on the asset pricing 
implications of various classes of preferences that feature relative consumption out-
look.  Gali (1994) studies “consumption externatilities” in which agents’ utility de-
pends on temporal levels of both his/her own consumption and per capita consump-
tion in both a CAPM framework and a multi-period model.  Abel (1990) defines util-
ity as the ratio of own consumption relative to lagged3 per capita consumption in a 
Lucas (1978) pure exchange economy framework.  The utility function introduced by 
Abel (1990) nests (1) time-separable utility, (2) “catching up with the Joneses” util-
ity, (3) utility that displays internal habit formation, under the assumption that con-
sumption growth is i.i.d.  When an individual’s marginal utility of own consumption 
is highly sensitive to variations in per capita consumption, it is also strongly nega-
tively related to stock returns.  Therefore, even if α is small, i.e., the investor is not 
                                                 
3 Hence Abel (1990) uses the phrase “catching up with the Joneses” rather than “keeping up with the 
Joneses”. (Abel, 1990: 38, footnote 1) 
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averse to own-consumption risk, stocks will not be appealing because he/she is 
highly averse to per capita consumption risk.  This is the case for any specification of 
α and β.  In both habit formation and relative consumption (catching or keeping up 
with the Joneses) models, effective risk aversion and prudence (i.e., convex marginal 
utility and strong precautionary motive) become implausibly large, letting the equity 
premium puzzle remain unsolved. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 918) 
3.4 Incomplete Markets, Heterogeneous Agents and Market Frictions 
Market completeness implies that the individual can write insurance contracts against 
any idiosyncratic risk, leaving aggregate risk as the only risk that affects individual 
consumption.  If, moreover, individuals have identical Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion preferences, individual consumption is proportional to (i.e., is a fraction of) ag-
gregate consumption. (Atkeson and Phelan, 1994: 1)  “Full consumption insurance 
implies that heterogeneous consumers are able to equalize their marginal rates of 
substitution state by state.” (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996: 220)  The equilibrium 
in a heterogeneous full-information economy is isomorphic in its pricing implica-
tions to the equilibrium in a representative-household, full-information economy, if 
households have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 
918)  With incomplete insurance markets, on the other hand, variability of individual 
consumption may exceed that of aggregate consumption, and asset prices may differ 
substantially from those predicted by a representative consumer model. (Heaton and 
D. Lucas, 1996: 444) 
This strand of literature tries to explain the equity premium puzzle by relax-
ing Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) assumption that asset markets are complete, by in-
troducing transaction costs, borrowing constraints, persistence of idiosyncratic 
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shocks and market segmentation.  I preferred not to discuss the implications of add-
ing transaction costs besides other sources of market incompleteness in a separate 
section.  The problems of this section are necessarily general equilibrium as opposed 
to the problem of a representative consumer.  
3.4.1. Dynamic Self-insurance, the Persistence of Idiosyncratic Shocks (and 
Transactions Costs) 
In a two-period model in which financial markets are incomplete, Weil (1992) shows 
that the additional variability in consumption growth induced by market incomplete-
ness helps to explain - the risk free rate puzzle, if individuals exhibit prudence, and - 
the equity premium puzzle, if individuals exhibit not just prudence but decreasing 
absolute prudence (“see Kimball 1990”). (Kocherlakota, 1996: 59) 
Two period models do not allow for dynamic self-insurance against income 
risk, which is the smoothing of consumption through borrowing against future in-
come that can be done in longer-period or infinite horizon settings.  If, on the other 
hand, the individual knows that he/she will live for many more years, he/she need not 
absorb income risk fully into current consumption, he/she can partially offset it by 
saving relatively more when his/her income is high and less during lower income 
periods.  The extra demand for savings due to the absence of insurance markets will 
typically be smaller in the infinite horizon economy than in a two-period model.  If 
individuals can dynamically self-insure, the induced interest rate will not be much 
less than the complete markets interest rate.  As long as the interest rate is well-
approximated by the complete markets interest rate, and the persistence of shocks to 
income are sufficiently low (i.e., income shocks have an autocorrelation sufficiently 
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less than one), then the equity premium puzzle cannot be explained by market in-
completeness. (Kocherlakota, 1996: 61-63)  
Current financial paradigms postulate that idiosyncratic income 
shocks must exhibit three properties in order to explain the returns on 
financial assets: uninsurability, persistence, heteroscedasticity and 
countercyclical conditional variance. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 918) 
Telmer (1993) and D. Lucas (1994) study models with transitory idiosyncratic 
shocks and borrowing or short-selling constraints.  They conclude that:  
even though agents cannot insure against idiosyncratic shocks, pre-
dicted asset prices are similar to those with complete markets.  This 
occurs because when idiosyncratic shocks are transitory, consumption 
can be effectively smoothed by accumulating financial assets after 
good shocks and selling assets after bad shocks. (Heaton and D. Lu-
cas, 1996: 444) 
Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) add transaction costs to a related model where agents 
trade to offset transitory idiosyncratic shocks and predicted asset prices are similar to 
complete-markets asset prices, provided that the supply of bonds is not unrealisti-
cally low. (Heaton and D. Lucas, 1996: 444 and Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 918, 919) 
Heaton and D. Lucas (1996) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics to find that undiversifiable shocks to individual income are not persistent. 
(Kocherlakota, 1996: 61)  They study an incomplete markets economy with indi-
viduals unable to write contracts contingent on future labor income.  There are three 
types of uncertainty, the first two of which are aggregate: (1) systematic labor in-
come risk, (2) dividend income risk, (3) idiosyncratic labor income risk.  There exists 
trade in financial securities, but frictions such as borrowing constraints, short-sales 
constraints, and transactions costs also exist.  In their paper, they decompose the ef-
fect of transactions costs on the equity premium into two components: (1) the direct 
effect that occurs “because individuals equate the net-of-cost margins”, (2) the indi-
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rect effect; that individual consumption correlates more with individual income.  “In 
the simulations, [they] find that the direct effect dominates and that the model can 
produce a sizable equity premium only if transactions costs are large or the assumed 
quantity of tradable assets is limited.” (Heaton and D. Lucas, 1996: 443) 
Constantinides and Duffie (1996) study the case of many agents with identi-
cal utility functions but permanent idiosyncratic labor income shocks.  They point 
out that when idiosyncratic income shocks are persistent (i.e., have an autocorrela-
tion more than one) instead of transitory, the individual cannot dynamically self-
insure but must absorb them fully into consumption. (Kocherlakota 1996: 61)  They 
provide an explanation of the countercyclical behavior of the equity risk premium; 
the investors require a larger equity premium in a recession, because they expect 
stocks to perform poorly in recessions, when the risk of job loss increases. (Mehra 
and Prescott, 2003: 919) 
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001a), use empirical evidence from the 
Panel Study on Income Dynamics to show that idiosyncratic income shocks are per-
sistent and have countercyclical conditional variance. 
Krebs (2000), Constantinides (2002), and Levine and Zame (2002) are other 
important contributions to this area of research. 
“Dumas (1989), Grossman and Zhou (1996), Wang (1996), Sandroni (1999) 
and Chan and Kogan (2002) move in a somewhat different direction by exploring the 
interactions of agents who have different levels of risk aversion.” (Campbell, 2003: 
809)  Chan and Kogan (2002: 1256) study an economy with heterogeneous agents 
who have relative risk aversion that is constant over time but is varied across the 
population:  
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The aggregate risk premium in such an economy exhibits counter-
cyclical variation due to endogenous changes in the cross-sectional 
distribution of wealth.  Relatively risk-tolerant agents hold a higher 
proportion of their wealth in stocks.  Therefore, a decline in the stock 
market reduces the fraction of aggregate wealth controlled by such 
agents and hence their contribution to the aggregate risk aversion.  
Thus the equilibrium risk premium rises as a result of a fall in stock 
prices.  
3.4.2. Borrowing and Short Sales Constraints 
Constantinides et al. (2002) study a 3-period overlapping-generations model to see 
the implications of heterogeneity of consumers across generations and borrowing 
constraints on the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle.  
Of the 3 generations, the young are born with a modest endowment income.  
The middle-aged, earn stochastic wage income.  The senior citizen earns no wage 
income, but sells the bonds and equity accumulated in the previous period in order to 
consume.  Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous within a generation; in fact, 
they model each generation of consumers with a representative consumer.  They ig-
nore the possible income heterogeneity within a generation (a type of market incom-
pleteness) in order to see the implications of heterogeneity across generations in-
duced by the nature of overlapping-generations.  The model has two forms of market 
incompleteness.  First, consumers of one generation (the young) may not trade 
claims against their future wage earnings with consumers of another generation (the 
middle-aged).  Note that the old are to dissave, as there is no bequest.  “Second, con-
sumers of one generation are prohibited from trading bonds and equity with consum-
ers of an unborn generation.” (Constantinides et al., 2002: 272)  
The authors explore the implications of a borrowing constraint by contrasting 
the stationary equilibria in the borrowing-constrained and borrowing-unconstrained 
versions of the economy.  If borrowing is constrained, the young cannot borrow 
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against their future earnings from the middle-aged who would like to save, and thus 
equity is exclusively priced by the middle-aged.  The middle-aged hold a diversified 
portfolio of bonds and stocks in each case.   
“A key insight of [their] paper is that as the correlation of equity income with 
consumption changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does the attractiveness 
of equity as an asset.” (Constantinides et al., 2002: 270)  For the young generation 
looking forward, the correlation of equity income with consumption will not be high, 
as Davis and Willen (2000) empirical study shows.  Therefore equity has hedge 
value against the fluctuations of uncertain future wage for the young.  The middle-
aged have their wage uncertainty resolved and will not be receiving retirement wage 
income, so the fluctuations in their consumption occur from fluctuations in equity 
income.  Correlation of equity income with consumption is high, so that the middle-
aged require a higher return to equity than the young do.   
With complete markets and no frictions, the young, who have low endow-
ment income and expect higher wages next period, should borrow from the middle-
aged, consume a part of the loan and invest the rest in higher return equity.  How-
ever, “they are prevented from doing so because human capital alone does not collat-
eralize major loans in modern economies for reasons of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.” (Constantinides et al., 2002: 271)   
If the borrowing constraint is relaxed, the young will borrow to pur-
chase equity, thereby raising the bond yield.  The increase in the 
bond yield induces the middle-aged to shift their portfolio holdings 
from equity to bonds. …. On balance, the effect is to increase both 
the equity and the bond return while simultaneously shrinking the 
equity premium. (Constantinides et al., 2002: 271,272)  
 28
Furthermore, with the relaxation of the borrowing constraint, the net demand for 
bonds declines, and the bond return roughly doubles.  The borrowing constraint, they 
argue, goes a long way toward explaining the risk-free rate puzzle.  
Pavlov (2006) is a follow-up to Constantinides et al. (2002).  Pavlov asserts 
that there is a problem with the interpretation of the Constantinides et al. (2002) re-
sults: it is not clear whether it is the life-cycle or the other sources of market incom-
pleteness that is responsible for the conclusions.  According to Pavlov, the economy 
of Constantinides et al. (2002) is incomplete along a number of dimensions:  First, 
the young face income risks against which they have no insurance.  Second, the 
structure of the economy with the implied time period between trades of 25 years 
imposes severe limitations on portfolio rebalancing.  Finally, for an economy to be 
dynamically complete the number of independent assets must match the number of 
uncertainty states.  The Constantinides et al. (2002) economy is driven by an exoge-
nous Markov process with four possible states every period, but only two independ-
ent assets available.  By modifying the asset structure to make insurance markets 
conditionally complete, [Pavlov (2006)] shows that the asset structure by itself im-
poses significant restrictions on the composition of available trades, leading to an 
over-concentration of risks when the borrowing restriction is imposed. (Pavlov, 
2006: 156) 
3.4.3. Market Segmentation 
In an attempt to respond to objections to empirical work done to estimate the size of 
the equity premium regarding their reliance on consumption data aggregated across 
stockholding and nonstockholding households, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) put for-
ward a model with two groups of consumers, stockholders and nonstockholders.  
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They use 1984 Panel Study of Income Dynamics data “to construct a time series of 
the consumption of stockholders and a time series of the consumption of nonstock-
holders”.  They conclude that “nonstockholding consumers are unlikely to satisfy the 
first-order conditions for the optimal holding of assets that underlie the Consumption 
CAPM”. (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991: 98) 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) find evidence of a time-varying world price of 
risk related to the business cycle, taking market integration into consideration.  Hali-
assos and Bertaut (1995), Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002), and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002) are other research efforts worth mentioning in this strand of litera-
ture. 
3.5 Models Incorporating a Disaster State and Survivorship Bias 
Rietz (1988) proposes a solution to the equity premium puzzle that incorporates a 
very small probability of a very large negative consumption shock.  He finds that the 
equity premium is much larger in such a scenario.  The model requires a 1-in-100 
probability of a 25% decline in consumption to reconcile the equity premium with a 
risk aversion parameter of 10.  Such a scenario has not been observed in the USA for 
the years for which we have economic data.  One important implication of this model 
is that the real interest rate and the perceived probability of occurrence of a disas-
trous event move inversely.  But empirically, such inverse movement has not been 
observed.  (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 920) 
Another idea aimed at solving the equity premium puzzle that focuses on sur-
vival bias was suggested by Brown et al. (1995).  They draw attention to the phe-
nomenon that empirical studies include in their sample only the stocks that survive 
(i.e., provide return data) throughout the period of study.  “In general this condition-
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ing induces a spurious relationship between observed return and total risk for those 
securities that survive to be included in the sample.” (Brown et al, 1995: 853)  Also, 
they note that the US stock market has successfully withstood the financial fluctua-
tions, whereas many other exchanges were unsuccessful and therefore the ex-ante 
equity premium was low.   
Since it is not known a priori which exchanges would survive, for 
this explanation to work, stock and bond markets must be differen-
tially impacted by a financial crisis.  Governments have expropriated 
much of the real value of nominal debt by the mechanism of unan-
ticipated inflation. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 920) 
In financial crises, bonds are as likely to lose value as stocks.  Although a survival 
bias may affect the levels of both the return on stocks and bonds, there is no evidence 
that these crises have an impact on the equity premium. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 
921) 
3.6 Liquidity Premium 
Bansal and Coleman (1996), and Heaton and D. Lucas (1996) have argued that the 
risk-free rate is low because short-term Treasury bills are more liquid than long-term 
equities.  Short-term debt is “moneylike” in that it facilitates transactions and can be 
traded at minimal cost.  The liquidity advantage of debt reduces its required return 
and therefore increases the equity premium.  Return data of long-term government 
bonds weaken this argument.  Long-term government bonds are not moneylike and 
the liquidity premium argument implies that they should offer a high return.  Yet, 
historically the term premium has been many times smaller than the equity premium.  
Moreover, the excess return on stocks over long-term government bonds is as severe 
a premium as the standard equity premium. (Campbell, 2003: 827) 
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3.7 Taxes and Regulation 
McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) look at whether changes in the tax and regula-
tory systems in the USA account for the high return on equity for the period 1960-
2000. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 924)  In 1962, debt and not equity could be held 
tax free. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 925)  
The important changes in the legal-regulatory system, most of which 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were that corporate equity 
was permitted to be held as pension fund reserves and that people 
could invest on a before-tax basis in individual retirement accounts 
that could include equity. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 925) 
Evidence of the importance of these changes is that the share of cor-
porate equity held in retirement accounts and pension fund reserves 
increased from essentially zero in 1962 to slightly over 50% in 2000.  
This is important because it means half of corporate dividends are 
now subject to zero taxation. (Mehra and Prescott, 2003: 927) 
3.8 Irrational Expectations 
There is a strand of literature that investigates the results of relaxing the assumption 
that investors have rational expectations and understand the time-series behavior of 
dividend and consumption growth.  Many of the papers in this area work in partial 
equilibrium.  Examples of papers that assume stocks are priced by discounting ex-
pected future dividends at a constant rate are Chow (1989), Barsky and De Long 
(1993), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), 
and Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000).  Modigliani and Cohn (1979), Ritter and Warr 
(2002) and Sharpe (2003) are papers featuring investors that suffer a failure to under-
stand the difference between real and nominal magnitudes. (Campbell, 2003: 876, 
877) 
3.9 Stochastic Discount Factors (Pricing Kernel Approach) 
Campbell (2003: 807) points out that:  
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Shiller (1982), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), and Cochrane and 
Hansen (1993), building on the work of Rubinstein (1976), have re-
lated the equity premium puzzle to the volatility of the stochastic dis-
count factor, or equivalently the volatility of the intertemporal mar-
ginal rate of substitution of a representative investor.  Expressed in 
these terms, the equity premium puzzle is that an extremely volatile 
stochastic discount factor is required to match the ratio of the equity 
premium to the standard deviation of stock returns (the Sharpe ratio of 
the stock market). 
According to Cochrane and Hansen (1993), “the predictability of returns is only an 
anomaly given evidence that this predictability is at odds with the time series behav-
ior of marginal rates of substitution or transformation”.  “Market frictions can loosen 
the link between asset markets and measured intertemporal marginal rates of substi-
tution [and transformation] based on aggregate data”. (Cochrane and Hansen, 1993: 
37)  These include short-sale constraints, transaction costs, imperfect markets and 
borrowing constraints.  
A stochastic discount factor is any random variable that satisfies the equality 
of portfolio prices and expected value of discounted portfolio payoffs, for every port-
folio payoff.  “One theoretical device for generating a stochastic discount factor from 
an underlying model is to use the implied intertemporal marginal rate of substitution 
of consumers in the model”. (Cochrane and Hansen, 1993: 8)  Therefore, “alternative 
models can imply differing stochastic discount factors”. (Cochrane and Hansen, 
1993: 3)  Cochrane and Hansen (1993) aim to characterize the properties of the dis-
count factors, through which “models generate asset price predictions”, that are con-
sistent with the behavior of asset market data.  One conclusion they make is that “A 
successful discount factor must be either highly correlated with asset returns, or have 
even higher variance than indicated by the original bounds derived in Hansen and 
Jagannathan (1991).”  Their “second extension used conditioning information to split 
the unconditional variance of discount factors into two components: on average con-
 33
ditional variance and variation in conditional means.” (Cochrane and Hansen, 1993: 
55) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The EPP is perhaps the most important empirical puzzle that represents the failure of 
paradigms central to financial and economic modeling to explain the dynamics of 
asset pricing.  Because we base our economic intuition on these frameworks, our 
understanding of the macroeconomy will be impaired until the EPP gets resolved.  
The EPP, according to many sources, has not been resolved and continues to chal-
lenge financial economists along the lines of research I talked about and definitely on 
others as well.  Kocherlakota (1996: 66, 67) suggests that among the various ap-
proaches to explain away the EPP, arbitrage between equities and bonds being ruled 
out by trading frictions and individuals having a value of the relative risk aversion 
larger than ten are the more promising.  Mehra and Prescott (2003: 911) conclude 
that none of the research efforts covered in their survey “have fully resolved the 
anomalies”. 
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